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ABSTRACT
HOLLIE S. MANN: Getting Political Theory Pregnant: Conceiving a New
Model of Political Personhood.
(Under the direction of Susan Bickford, Ph.D..)
This paper explores the challenges that the pregnant subject poses to a liberal con-
ception of the self that presupposes rationality as a fundamental element of personhood
without considering corporeality. I contend that such challenges must be taken seri-
ously by liberals who assume a rational individualist model of human beings and then
build upon such a conception self in order to emphasize or develop a particular set of
core principles by which we ought to live. More importantly, these challenges ought to
be taken seriously by feminists who have relied primarily on a woman’s capacity for
rationality and autonomy to advance theories of justice. Finally, this paper addresses
ethics of care theorists who have challenged liberalism but have failed to ground their
theories in a conception of “normal” personhood as constituted by both rationality and
corporeality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Feminist political theory is at once disruptive to mainstream political theory—a thorn
in the side of the (still) male-dominated discipline—and vital to it. Broadly speaking,
feminist theoretical claims seek to alter or displace those dominant theoretical claims,
and the cultural norms they engender within the field, that have thus far served to deny
or discount the multiple realities that both constitute and are constituted by women’s
experiences. Simply put, feminist political theorists reimagine the political. Sometimes
our methods are constructivist, while at other times we take up a more deconstructive
approach; either way, we are always in the process of renegotiating the boundaries of
politics.
This paper criticizes and builds upon several important feminist challenges that
have been made to the liberal conception of the self. The established challenges to
liberalism that are considered in this essay fall within the boundaries of the ethics of
care literature, which represents a response to liberalism’s inadequacies and exclusivities
where conceptions of what it means to be a human being are concerned. My goal here
is to position myself within this literature in one sense, and yet to depart from it in
another. I see myself within the ethics of care literature in so far as I take the relational
aspects of the human condition seriously and believe they must serve as the starting
place—not the finishing line—of political theory. Yet, I also see myself largely outside
of this literature since I want us to move beyond both the “feminine morality” and
the “caring as politics” approaches that I will argue currently comprise the ethics of
care literature. Thus, it will be necessary for me to clearly articulate what I view as
the particular shortcomings of the efforts to disrupt liberalism that have been made
thus far. Finally, I will suggest that we begin to think about the possibilities for an
alternative challenge to liberalism and urge us to embark on some rather unexplored
territory in political theory—the pregnant body—for reimagining our/selves outside of
the dominant liberal paradigm.
Nancy Hirschmann and Christine Di Stefano (1996) view the core of feminist po-
litical theory as an effort to grapple with traditional political concepts (6-13). They
identify three distinct but related approaches to doing feminist political theory. First,
feminist theorists interrogate the apolitical posture of those concepts that are typically
deemed beyond the realm of politics. This project seeks to challenge our deeply held
beliefs about what things may be properly understood as political. Hirschmann and Di
Stefano point to the way in which the concept of privacy has been radically politicized
in recent decades by feminist theorists (see, for example, Elshtain 1981; Okin 1989; Ack-
elsberg and Shanley 1996). Once considered the theoretical and literal domain of all
that is the opposite of “the political,” feminist political theory has urged us to question
the validity of the public (political)/private (nonpolitical) distinction. Second, feminist
political theorizing engages in the project of scrutinizing the “innocent space” (Flax
1992) of political theory. Closely related to the first approach, in that both seek to
politicize concepts that have previously been understood as nonpolitical, delving into
the “innocent space” of political theory is even more dangerous because it goes after the
foundational premises of political theory. This project seeks to change that which we
currently conceive of as unalterable. While the first approach might demand something
like the redrawing of political boundaries to include certain activities that take place
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in the private sphere, the second approach might explicitely call into question what
exactly we mean by a political concept like freedom, for example (Hirschmann 1996;
Zerilli 2005). Hirschmann and Di Stefano explain:
The innocent space is the foundational space of political theory; here we
find concepts that “ground” particular notions of the political and are very
often taken for granted as uncontestable. On closer inspection, this innocent
space displays far more “corruption” than was previously appreciated and
accounted for. This “corruption” consists of instability in what was thought
to be firm and fixed; it is revealed in the cultural and historical specificity
of concepts and norms that were presumed to be universal; and it surfaces
whenever a persuasive case can be made that “innocent” starting points or
foundations are themselves the effect or outcomes of power. (10)
Ontological, epistemological, and core conceptual claims that counter parallel pre-
vailing assumptions, those things which are always taken for granted, fall into this
category. Finally, Hirschmann and Di Stefano posit that feminist political theory is
interested in rethinking those concepts that are already understood as political. This
project seeks to broaden our deeply held beliefs. Contrary to commonly held beliefs,
feminist theorists are not interested in completely doing away with current political
concepts and constructions. We are, however, obliged to bring women’s experiences to
bear on those concepts and constructions, thus inevitably altering them. Still, we do
not seek to withdraw entirely from ongoing dialogues and debates but rather desire to
deepen such conversations so as to make them more meaningful. Although these are
three distinct ways of thinking about doing political theory, they are by no means mu-
tually exclusive. Indeed, there is much overlap, and often the work of a single feminist
theorist does more than one of these tasks at a time.
I offer the framework provided by Hirschmann and Di Stefano for two reasons: First,
I believe it to be extremely helpful for thinking about the business of feminist political
theory generally. Also, it captures what I ambitiously set out to do here. I seek to
challenge the notion that the pregnant body is morally and politically irrelevant for
the purposes of thinking through how we ought to live together in a democratic society.
3
I seek to change our most basic beliefs about how we understand ourselves as (political)
human beings, as well as how we understand pregnancy. Finally, I seek to broaden our
view of what it means to be a democratic citizen given our new self-understandings.
In this paper, I will focus primarily on the second project, which will require us to
briefly consider the first. I will not here explicitly outline institutional and structural
changes that should be brought about by our new self-understandings, though that is
certainly a part of my larger project. However, I see this paper as potentially engaging
with and contributing to a larger body of literature on democracy and citizenship, thus
broadening our understanding of both of these familiar concepts in political theory. I
will not here develop a comprehensive theory of the pregnant subject as a model for
rethinking ourselves as democratic citizens. But once we have a grasp on the particular
liberal conception of the self I am considering in this paper, and have parsed through
what is useful and what is not, both for women and for democracy, about the ethics of
care literature in terms of challenging liberalism, we will have done much of the work to
clear the way for the pregnant body to emerge as a useful starting place for theorizing
the political.
It is not my intention to essentialize women, or to adopt the uncritical view that
women’s bodies or experiences provide them with a privileged position relative to men.
Instead, I share the view of Elizabeth Grosz that if “feminists are to resuscitate a
concept of the body for their own purposes, it must be extricated from the biological
and pseudo-naturalist appropriations from which it has historically suffered,” (1994:
20). I think this is possible by attempting to disrupt the mind/body split, and by
recognizing that the particular corporeal form I explore in this paper—the pregnant
body—is perhaps best thought of as a field of bodies, rather than a singular body. Grosz
describes a field of bodies as a “discontinuous, nonhomogenous, nonsingular space, a
space that admits of differences, incommensurability, intervals or gaps between types,
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a field, in short, that is established and regulated according to various perspectives and
interests” (23). Although I do not expand very much on the notion of the pregnant
body as a field in this paper, it is consistent with the way in which I wish to take up
the body here.
I argue that the pregnant subject complicates and poses significant challenges to
a liberal conception of the self that presupposes rationality as a fundamental element
of personhood without taking into account corporeality. These challenges ought to be
taken seriously by liberals who assume a rational individualist model of human be-
ings and then build upon such a conception self in order to emphasize or develop a
particular set of core principles by which we ought to live. More importantly, these
challenges ought to be taken seriously by liberal feminists who have relied solely on a
woman’s capacity for rationality and autonomy to advance theories of justice or equal-
ity. Finally, this paper criticizes nonliberal feminists who have attempted to challenge
liberalism but have failed to ground their theories in a conception of the human condi-
tion as always already constituted by embodied persons who are both interdependent
and mutually interested in one another by virtue of both rationality and corporeality.
Basically, they have ignored the body; specifically, they have overlooked the pregnant
body as a potential site for reimagining political personhood. My argument is twofold:
I intend to demonstrate that a new understanding of the pregnant body helps us to
acquire a more accurate understanding of what it means to be human both caring and
dependent. Beyond a theoretical argument that draws out the importance of corporeal-
ity for conceptions of personhood, there is also a normative component to the argument
I am advancing. I hope to convince the reader that the pregnant body also provides us
with a better model for thinking about how we ought to think of ourselves, and that it
is by adopting a pregnant model of personhood that practices and relationships of care
and dependency can be widely accepted.
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This paper is divided into seven sections. I begin with a discussion of the body’s
importance for political theory, as well as how I want to think about the body in this
paper. Then I move on to explore a particular version of the liberal conception of the
self. Specifically, I consider John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. I engage with Rawls for
three reasons: First, Rawls provides us with an especially robust and intricate account
of the self from which he derives the principles of justice. Second, Rawls is one of the
most prominent, if not the most prominent, liberal theorists of the twentieth century.
Third, there have been many criticisms of Rawlsian liberalism set forth which seek to
challenge his conception of political personhood, but none of them have succeeded in
giving us an adequate alternative conception of personhood. Rather, they have tended
to point to alternative ways of organizing society or other values besides justice that we
might emphasize. While insightful, these alternatives do not quite get at the root of the
problem, which is a particular conception of personhood that does not comport with
alternative practices and ways that we might organize society. In contrast, the argument
I will set forth criticizes the Rawlsian conception of personhood and seeks to replace it
with a new one. I believe such a replacement is necessary, since theoretical arguments
about how to best organize society are closely related to fundamental assumptions
about the self.
The third, fourth and fifth sections of the paper considers some criticisms of liber-
alism that have been advanced within the liberal feminist tradition, as well as in the
ethics of care literature. The sixth section discusses the importance of conceptions of
the self and explores what I think we are doing when we make claims about what con-
stitutes a politically relevant human characteristic in political theory. The final section
attempts to find a middle road between the two strands in the ethics of care literature
by exploring the pregnant subject as a useful starting place for an alternative to the
rational, autonomous self are the heart of liberalism.
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In order to theorize the pregnant body outside of the discourse of liberalism, we must
say more about what the pregnant body is and how we might conceptualize it. Since we
generally understand pregnancy within a liberal paradigm of human nature, thinking of
the pregnant woman and the fetus as two clearly separate entities with fixed and rigid
boundaries, this will require a great deal of patience. We must attempt to talk about
the pregnant body outside of the dominant liberal paradigm, while at the same time
recognizing and being mindful of the pervasiveness of that discourse. The pregnant
subject that I attempt to construct illuminates a radically different account of the
human condition, one which takes seriously our embodied experiences and repositions
the pregnant subject as a model of political personhood for everyone, rather than a
politically irrelevant and contingent identity status. Uncovering the challenges the
pregnant subject poses to the liberal model of personhood will require all of us to
engage in the process of rethinking ourselves. Let me begin by addressing some valid
concerns about the dangers of developing a corporeal feminism, and discussing why the
body is so important for political theory in general
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Chapter 2
Body Matters
Many feminists recoil at the idea of developing feminist theories of corporeality,
or taking up the body as a potential site of resistance, transformation, and liberation
from “malestream” political theory. This is understandable, since biology and women’s
association with bodily functions, as opposed to the capacity for rationality, have long
been used to justify their lower status relative to men. There is also a sense in which
taking up the body seems quite antithetical to the project of political philosophy. Grosz
writes about the roles of rationality and the body in the Western philosophic tradition,
and its gendered implications:
Philosophy has always considered itself a discipline concerned primarily with
ideas, concepts, reason, judgment—that is, with terms clearly framed by the
concept of the mind, terms which marginalize or exclude considerations of
the body. As soon as knowledge is seen as purely conceptual, its relation
to bodies, the corporeality of both knowers and texts, and the ways these
materialities interact, must become obscure. As a discipline, philosophy
has surreptitiously excluded femininity, and ultimately women, from its
practices through its usually implicit coding of femininity with the unreason
associated with the body. It could be argued that philosophy as we know
it has established itself as a form of knowing, a form of rationality, only
through the disavowal of the body, specifically the male body, and the
corresponding elevation of mind as a disembodied term. (1994: 4)
Hesitancy to re-associate women as a group with the body is, in many ways, un-
surprising. Yet, I would like to suggest several reasons why the body is critical for
feminist political theory, as well as for political theory that does not necessarily claim
the name “feminist” but is nonetheless concerned to set forth ideas about the best
possible political world in which we might live.
Feminist theorists have always had to deal with the body, even if the dominant
Western philosophical tradition has dismissed it or, as Grosz suggests, set itself in
opposition to it. This is not the same as saying that all feminist theorists privilege
the body, for it is often the case that the body is addressed and then dispensed with
or bracketed in some way, but feminist theory differs significantly from nonfeminist
political theory in that it at least begins with acknowledgement that the body matters
(Shildrick and Price 1999: 1). Early radical feminist Shulamith Firestone (1971), for
example, argued that women must be freed from the chains of their biological status
as gestators if they are ever to take their rightful place alongside men. In contrast,
other radical feminists have argued for the privileging of women’s material reality and
experiences as compared with the way men see and think about the world, frequently
emphasizing their maternality and reproductive functions. Still other contemporary
feminists see the body as inescapable but fluid, the effect of power rather than a natural
given, a site of potentiality rather than foreclosure. Regardless of the particular manner
in which feminists choose to acknowledge or take up the body, it is precisely because
the Western philosophical tradition has associated women with the body, and the body
with all that is undesirable and problematic about human life, that feminist theorists
find themselves grappling with it and reconsidering its relevance for political theory
and practice. This sometimes looks like a defense of women’s capacity for rationality,
or resistance to the idea that women are (merely) bodies. At other times, it looks like
a defense of the body, or resistance to the idea that bodies can be legitimately ignored.
In any case, theorizing the body ought not to be such an unsettling prospect to feminist
political theorists; the historically male tradition in which we find ourselves has left us
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little choice.
To adequately theorize the body, we must disrupt the mind/body dualism that has
served to disadvantage women who are seen as bodies, while at the same time privileging
men who are seen as rational creatures who somehow possess the ability to transcend
their bodies in a relentless pursuit of the good life. While ancient philosophers, like
Plato, often constructed the body in opposition to the soul and to the capacity for
reason, which was thought to be encompassed by the soul, and others, like Paul and
Augustine, constructed the body in opposition to true salvation, it was Descartes who
really crystallized the mind/body distinction (Bordo 1993; Grosz 1994). Mind/body
dualism assumes that there are two distinct entities that are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive, each defined in gendered opposition to the other. It should be disrupted in
two ways. First, feminists seek to dispel the belief that women are bodies, while men
are rational creatures. Second, the hierarchical nature of the mind/body relationship
places the mind above the body, seeing it as far more fundamental to our identity as
human beings. The body must be restored to its proper place as equally constitutive
of humanity.
Feminists have contested and continue to contest the claim that women are mere
bodies and that men are somehow freed from the specificity and limitations of embodied
experience. Human beings, regardless of sex, are constituted by both a capacity for
reason and corporeality; it is not as though the former somehow liberates us from the
latter. Martha Nussbaum (2002: 2006) has been a forceful critic of the false dichotomy
between human dignity, which rests on the capacity for reason, and the natural world,
which is largely constituted by mere “animal dwellers.” She believes this split has
dangerous political implications for us because it “makes us think of the core of ourselves
as self-sufficient, not in need of the gifts of fortune; in so thinking we greatly distort
the nature of our own morality and rationality, which are thoroughly material and
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animal themselves” (189). Morality is, at least partly, an issue of materiality because
the kinds of moral choices available to us are related to, and often depend on and or
are constrained by our corporeality. In other words, we often privilege that which sets
us apart from animals, the ability to make moral choices based on our rationality, while
forgetting all that we share in common with them, and we do so at our own peril. I see
no apparent reason why we should seek to transcend the body, especially since it can
sometimes tell us important things about the world that the mind alone cannot. For
example, bodies, though variable, often tell us when we are tired and need sleep, or
hungry and need food, even when our rational selves might prefer to push on without
rest or nourishment. Bodies can tell us when to be afraid of a particular situation, thus
sending information to our brains that lets our rational selves know there is something
to fear even though we may have wanted to believe there was nothing there; the body
can work to change our minds about the world we apprehend.
I will explore the way in which the mind and the body are interrelated, but there is
also a sense in which the body can sometimes act independently of the mind, as Mary
O’Brien reminds us, “[R]eproductive labor might be said to combine the functions of the
architect and the bee: like the architect, parturitive woman knows what she is doing;
like the bee, she cannot help what she is doing,” (1979: 115). Denying our vulnerability
by denying our bodily existence gives us the persistent illusion of dominance and control.
Bodily knowledge can contradict this assumption.
Privileging rationality over corporeality has given us a distorted view of the self and
our relationship to the world in which we live. Nussbaum argues that “we learn to
ignore the fact that disease, old age, and accident can impede the moral and rational
functions, just as much as other animal functions,” and so we often are surprised or
infuriated to discover that we cannot do all that we think we can do or all that we
desire given the imperfect bodies we inhabit (189). Susan Bordo (1993) writes about
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how the deployment of the mind/body dualism by political philosophers has provided
instructions, rules, and models for the body, with the ultimate gain of “learning to
live without it” (145). Once we can control the body, the hope is that we can leave
it behind. The trouble we run into, of course, is that it’s rather difficult to “achieve
intellectual independence from the lure of the body’s illusions, to become impervious to
its distractions, and, most important, to kill off its desires and hungers” (Bordo 1993:
145).
In contrast to the move to dominate and then transcend the body, we might think
of it as less of a constraint on our rational faculties and more of a force that we must
learn to work with and adapt to. The mind would often have us believe we can control
and direct a great deal about our lives; but the body teaches us—if we would only
pay attention—that we are, in fact, not always in control and that this need not be
such a terrifying prospect. Despite major technological advancements, menstruation,
conception, pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and menopause are frequently, though
not always, completely beyond a woman’s control, even though these processes are
always interpreted and experienced in a particular social context. More importantly,
this series of surprises and changes in a woman’s body are not exceptions to a rule
of stability and stasis. Rather, when taken together, they constitute the majority of
many women’s lifecycle. Though excluded from these particular experiences, men are
not exempt from bodily functions. Often this is experienced as a lack or inability to do
something, as when one falls ill or ages and can no longer do the things that brought
happiness in one’s youth. Yet, again, the body can surprise us in a positive way by
giving us (bodily) knowledge that might contradict rational knowledge, as when illness
or disease unexpectedly subsides, or when the marathoner can complete twenty-six
miles even though his brain told him he should stop running miles back. The point is
that the mind/body dualism has encouraged us to experience the body as confinement
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and limitation, as a constraint on our rationality, or our “higher selves.” Disrupting the
dualism by bringing back into focus the fact that (all) human beings are constituted by
both animality and rationality will give us a more adequate and richer conception of
the self. Further, such a disruption can open the door for reconceptualizing the body,
helping us to see it as something other than a threat to all that our minds tell us we
could do if not confined to “imperfect” and “uncontrollable” bodies.
Beyond problematizing the notion that women are disadvantaged by their bodily
subjectivity—one that we have perhaps not done enough to dispell—and the view that
human beings are primarily defined by their capacity for reason, political theorists
should take seriously the idea of embodied subjectivity. A concept originally developed
by phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1962), embodied subjectivity has been taken up
and revised by feminists like Iris Marion Young (1990), Rosalyn Diprose (1994), and
Margaret McLaren (2002) to refer to the multiple ways in which the body and the
mind act upon one another. Grosz (1994: 6) notes that one of the biggest challenges
facing those who implicitly or explicitly ascribe to the mind/body dualism, as well as
those who wish to overcome it, is to explain necessary interactions and connections
between these two apparently always mutually exclusive entities. As I’ve said, we
often experience the body as acting independently of the mind, as in the case of a
pregnant women whose body cares for the fetus even if she does not necessarily want
it to. However, it is also the case that the body and the mind influence one another
in significant ways. Embodied subjectivity can express the way that the mind helps to
shape bodily experience, as well as the ways in which bodily experience shapes one’s
worldview.
Grosz notes that Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the body-subject and lived expe-
rience has resonated with many feminists who wish to argue that the production of
knowledge and the particular structures made manifest by certain types of knowledge
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rely on our lived experience (1994: 94). For Merleau-Ponty, as for Marx, the body
is not a mere passive thing to be manipulated by the forces of rationality. Feminists,
some of whom we will consider a bit later in the paper, have found common ground
with these two thinkers, arguing that women’s lived experience is radically different
from that of men, and thus gives them a unique standpoint from which to view the
world. In “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist
Historical Materialism,” Nancy Hartsock suggest that the Marxian method for analyz-
ing class relations provides a useful model for analyzing gender relations in a society
where women and men engage in different activities and, as a result, form different
relationships with both the social and natural world. Hartsock wants to attend to the
epistemological consequences of the claim that, generally speaking, women’s lives have
historically been quite different from the lives of men. Following Marx, she begins with
the division of labor, although she departs from Marx in positing a specifically sexual
division of labor that gives rise to the material conditions of women and men. Hartsock
does not believe the division can be reduced to mere social dimensions, and she is very
clear about her desire to “keep hold of” bodily experience. Men, whose lives are not
entirely encompassed by their role in the production of use-value objects, and who do
not participate in the process of reproducing other human beings, experience abstract
masculinity, that is, they experience the world as a self distinct from and in opposition
to others, alienated from both the social and the natural. In stark contrast, women
occupy a realm one can conceptualize as occupying a space below that of the male-
dominant reality—or underground, while still being forced to act within and speak the
language of the realm above. The female construction of self is one that tends toward
connectivity and continuity with both the social and the natural world (45). This self
is constituted by the material conditions, partly social and partly biological, of women
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and thus is likely to produce a worldview that is the actual inversion of men’s world-
view. This opens up a space for the feminist standpoint to emerge, though Hartsock
is clear that the extent to which this standpoint can be actualized and taken up by all
women (and men too, Hartsock hopes) depends on whether or not feminist theorists
are able to develop and articulate its structural determinants (48).
This brings me to the other important dimension of embodied subjectivity, the
articulation of experience as produced and lived through certain knowledges, theoretical
arguments about conceptions of the self, and social practices. Even as she suggests
women possess a unique standpoint, Hartsock acknowledges that we come to see and
to experience ourselves through the lens of dominant paradigms. We experience the
body through our relationship to ideology, and expected bodily norms and practices.
In Discipline and Punish (1979), as well as in The History of Sexuality (1980), Foucault
argues that bodies are “in the grip”, as he describes it, of dominant discourses of power.
Bordo writes of the importance of Foucault’s genealogical works in helping feminists to
articulate the power of dominant discourses on women’s lived bodies (1993: 142). For
example, we experience ourselves as fat or thin, beautiful or ugly, masculine or feminine,
depending on the particular knowledges available to us. Embodied experience, then,
cannot always be taken as an unproblematic given, or an authoritative position from
which to judge the validity of theoretical claims. Experience is both implicated in and
shaped by the particular knowledges and practices available to us. I am interested
here in both embodied subjectivity, as well as the ways in which those subjectivities,
and all that they invite and foreclose, are shaped by dominant discourses of power.
My own interpretation and understanding of pregnant bodies is intended to provide
an alternative to the dominant discourse on pregnant bodies, yet it cannot escape
power either. Indeed, this project seeks to provide an alternative conception of the self,
one that will create new ways to think about the self in relationship to others (new
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knowledge) and engender alternative practices of citizenship.
Before moving on, I would like to briefly address a criticism concerning the body’s
relevance to conceptions of specifically political personhood. Some might concede that
the body is obviously important, but bracket it for the purposes of generating explicitly
political principles. For example, many liberals are concerned with the body as some-
thing we should take care to protect, as in arguments for a right to bodily integrity
that are grounded in a Lockean conception of the body as personal property. This view
sees the body as a mere object to which the “true” self that is at the heart of political
theory has a right rather than drawing on a conception of self that actually encom-
passes the body. But this position is likely to generate unsatisfactory political results
because it relies on an unsatisfactory conception of the self.1 All arguments about the
proper way to apprehend and order the society in which we live closely with others—the
task of political theory as I see it—are related to fundamental assumptions about the
self.2 Some characteristics are certainly less important than others. For example, qual-
ities like hair color or height should not be relevant to shared conceptions of political
personhood because such particulars do not necessarily bear on how we conceptualize
justice, or how we should proceed in making decisions about the proper ordering of
society. Embodied subjectivity, however, helps us to see the particular ways in which
rationality and corporeality are interrelated, what is important for politics and what
is not. Also, bodily knowledge and lived experience can complicate some of our most
1Perhaps the best example of the failure of these kinds of liberal arguments is the contemporary
abortion debates. Viewing the body as a right which needs to be secured has resulted in a tremendous
impasse, as those who oppose abortion have successfully taken up similar arguments in defense of the
fetus’s right to life as have historically been mounted by feminists in support of a woman’s right to
control her own body. We only wait to see whose rights will triumph. If we had a conception of the
self that took the rational and bodily aspects of our existence seriously, we might not view pregnancy
as such a radical exception to the rule of physical autonomy and control.
2Even poststructuralist and postmodernist political theorists maintain a conception of the self,
thought it is a fractured one that is the effect of power rather than a natural entity that exists
somehow prior to power.
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widely held beliefs about what the political principles of a just society should and can
be. It should foreclose some possibilities, while simultaneously creating new ones.
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Chapter 3
Political Liberalism and the Rational Individual
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
The idea of inviolability is common in liberal political thought. It presumes that,
regardless of one’s relationship to others, human beings should strive for autonomy and
control over one’s body and mind to the fullest extent possible. For liberals like Mill and
Locke the individual is constructed in such a way as to diminish the vulnerability that
arises from our embodied experiences, or material existence. The idea of an individual
who is instead penetrable and perhaps lacking complete control over one’s mind and
body as a result of material and social realities is generally dismissed as unacceptable
and such individuals are considered to be not up to the task of citizenship. Perhaps it
is the predominance of the idea of inviolability the leads John Rawls to merely assume
the ideal rather than to justify it at the outset of A Theory of Justice when he boldly
proclaims, “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (1999: 3). Here, he gives the reader
insight into his view that there is a clear line to be drawn between self and other, and
between self and society. It is from this initial premise that Rawls makes the move to
claim that justice is the first virtue of all social institutions. The primacy of justice,
much like the primacy of the individual, is regarded by Rawls as obvious to the reader.
The remainder of the book, then, is an effort to provide us with a particular theory
that can justify justice as the first virtue of society and to persuade the reader that
the principles of justice that Rawls enumerates are indeed correct. Here, I will briefly
explain the original position, the conceptual device Rawls uses to arrive at the principles
of justice, and summarize his criteria for political personhood.
Rawls designates his theory “justice as fairness,” which is intended to convey the
idea that a truly just society is said to be fair if persons who are required to submit to
the procedures and institutions of a given society would choose those same principles
if they were totally ignorant of their position in society. Rawls is a contractarian who
believes we can imagine ourselves in a kind of state of nature in order to determine what
political principles and institutions are suitable. If, after engaging in the appropriate
exercise of reason, we cannot or would not submit to the rules of a given society, then
that society cannot be considered a just one.
Rawls introduces the original position as a kind of conceptual device from which
persons in a well-ordered society can choose the principles of justice they want their
social structures to embody. It is intended to simulate conditions that might exist prior
to the structuring of a particular political society, but with some general knowledge of
society and history. Equality is made possible in the original position with the veil
of ignorance, which means that persons in the original position have no knowledge of
their particular status in society, their “conceptions of the good,” or “their psychological
propensities” (1999: 11). Also, subjects are not granted even rational knowledge of the
particular type of body they inhabit. The veil of ignorance supposedly allows us to
move from “widely accepted but weak premises to more specific conclusions,” (1999:
16). The widely held but weak premises ideally allow Rawls to situate almost all
persons within the confines of the argument, and thus must make certain claims about
the nature of people living in a society that takes justice to be its primary virtue.1
1In A Theory of Justice, Rawls appears to be making universalistic claims about human beings
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To achieve fairness, then, equality must prevail in the original position, and so certain
commonly shared assumptions must hold there. Rawls believes these assumptions are
so widely accepted that, “one or more persons can at any time enter this position,
or perhaps better, simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by
reasoning in accordance with the appropriate restrictions,” (1999: 119). Depending on
the strength and limitations of his assumptions, it is possible that the original position
is restricted only to certain types of persons, thus having the effect of excluding others
from the ability to reason in accordance with the restrictions (Nagel 1989).
All persons in the original position possess rationality. Rawls has a peculiar and
rather strong account of rationality, which for him means that a person can give primacy
to his own plan of life and that he will always desire more goods rather than less in
order to pursue that plan of life (1999: 123). Yet, the ability to give primacy to one’s
own plan of life assumes a coherent, single subject who can in fact easily discern and
disentangle his own plan of life from another’s, not a particularly controversial idea in
liberal political theory. Natural and social forces that might prevent one from being
able to “rationally choose” are ruled out from the start. We might also note that it is
both the ability to make the choice to privilege one’s own interests and the actual move
to do so that constitutes rationality for Rawls. Choices made in the original position
can only be explained in terms of furthering self-interests.
Rawls also views the political subject as autonomous, a view that is shared by most
liberals (Jaggar 1983: 33):
and he makes no distinctions between persons who have a non-liberal conception of the good, and
liberal persons for whom competing conceptions of the good life are a necessary condition. However,
in later writings, most specifically in Justice as Fairness (1999), Rawls reconsiders and declares that
he is talking about “political personhood” within a constitutional democracy. In both cases, he
is making claims about what he takes to be the essential characteristics of a particular (political)
subject, and he does so by stripping away what he takes to be non-essential characteristics of persons,
or “contingencies.”
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Thus, in the usual way, a rational person is thought to have a coherent set
of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these options
according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which
will satisfy more of desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance
of being successfully executed. (1999: 124)
Putting aside the fact that many people are autonomous but still make bad choices,
it is the authority of self-judgment that Rawls is emphasizing here. In her analysis of
the major tenets of liberalism, Allison Jaggar makes a distinction between those who
emphasize the moral versus the instrumental value of reason:
Those who emphasize the moral aspect of reason stress the value of in-
dividual autonomy; that is, they value reliance on individual judgment,
uncoerced and unindoctrinated, rather than on established authority in
determining matters of truth and morality. Those liberal theorists who
emphasize the instrumental aspects of reason stress the value of individual
self-fulfillment and the importance of each individual’s being able to pursue
her or his own self-interest as he or she defines it. (1983: 33)
This distinction cannot be easily made, however, because it obscures the way in
which the instrumentality of reason is related to autonomy. The liberal who values
reason as instrumental in helping us pursue a plan of life still presumes autonomy
because the individual must be able to define what his or her interests are in the first
place. It is true that Rawls does not explicitly make a normative claim that we should
always regard ourselves as autonomous and ignore social constraints. The criterion in
the original position is considerably stronger. We simply are all autonomous creatures
and thus possess the authority to rank our individual options and further our self-
interests, even if we forfeit our right to do so once we’re in society. This conception of
political personhood privileges self-judgment over other potential social influences, and
it dismisses the possibility that a person may be unable to act with such authority in
society, that is, to be autonomous, given their experiences of sociality, community, or
corporeality.
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Finally, persons in the original position must be mutually disinterested with respect
to all other parties behind the veil. This is meant to ensure that people are ”neither
envious nor altruistic” when deciding on the principles of justice. The only thing we
know about our relationships with others is that we have competing interests given the
condition of moderate scarcity, and that no prevailing view of the good life is imposed
on us. Persons behind the veil are prevented from taking any interest, positive or
negative, in one another’s interests.2 Rawls cautions us to not confuse the conditions
of the original position with what persons might do in ordinary life or in a well-ordered
society, but the constraints of the original position are intended to reflect fair terms
of social cooperation to which any rational person would agree prior to entering into
society.
Knowledge about oneself or the world is rational knowledge; subjects can imagine
the possibility of certain things, but they are denied embodied knowledge. No one
knows his or her sex, race, class, natural abilities, or affinities. Rawls selects this pecu-
liar method of stripping away all of the social and material conditions of human life in
an effort to get at some kind of categorical or universal identity:
The veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that something like it must
have occurred to many. The formulation in the text is implicit, I believe,
in Kant’s doctrine of the categorical imperative, both in the way this pro-
cedural criterion is defined and the use Kant makes of it. Thus when Kant
tells us to test our maxim by considering what would be the case were it
a universal law of nature, he must suppose that we do not know our place
within this imagined system of nature. (1999: 118)
More than the presupposition of ignorance of place within this imagined system,
Kant and Rawls both assume that we do not know the particular ways in which we
2Persons in the original position do take an interest in some (unknown to them) third party, and
this is why Rawls conceives of them as “continuing persons,” or heads of households. However, the
third party is merely an extension of the self as Rawls conceives it and designed to secure goods for
future genetic lines.
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experience our particular place in the imagined system of nature. Rawls cannot main-
tain his conception of political personhood while at the same time maintaining that
bodies provide us with a certain kind of knowledge that the mind alone cannot. For
Rawls, embodied knowledge prevents the possibility of unanimity because we would
seek outcomes that would be beneficial to our particular bodies.
It is not hard to see why Rawls wants to avoid such bias. Keeping the body out
allows him to maintain his particular conception of the political subject. Yet, there is
a loss that occurs with this move. Rawls is assuming that bodily experience is never so
fundamental that it is constitutive of the (political) self. The requirement of unanimity
in the original position is made possible, in part, by the exclusion of the body. Subjects
in the original position know that they have a body, but are denied knowledge about
themselves and the world that is gained through embodied experience.
Rawls is careful to point out that the original position is distinct from Kant’s tran-
scendental argument in that it at least attempts to establish a foundation for the right
over the good that is grounded in some kind of practical “real world” situation. Later,
important criticisms of A Theory of Justice were advanced, most notably those of
Thomas Nagel (1989) and Michael Sandel (1982), which challenged his theory on the
grounds that his conception of personhood was particularistic, not universal, and that
the conditions of the original position were far too strong to extend beyond a specific
group of people.
Rawls attempted to meet some of his critics objections in “Justice as Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical Personhood,” (1992) as well as in Political Liberalism (1993).
He conceded that his theory of justice is not intended to be universally applicable,
but rather is tailored for a specific kind of society, wherein there exists a plurality of
incommensurable ideas of the good. The original position now appears as a conceptual
tool that can be tailored to help us discover the principles of justice that would be agreed
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upon by rational persons living in a constitutional democracy. This begs two questions:
First, can such a method ever be useful since it always requires an extreme abstraction
of the world in which we live? Perhaps there is a contractarian out there somewhere
who can adequately capture the complexities of the human condition and from that
deduce principles on which we can all agree. I will leave this question for others to
answer and move on to the second issue that concerns me here: Can a conception
of political personhood within a liberal democracy be considered adequate if it only
accounts for rationality while dismissing other aspects of personhood? Can it help us
to develop appropriate political principles and practices?
The overarching theme taken up by most feminist critics of liberalism is that it relies
on a conception of the self that masks relationships of care, dependence/interdependence,
and mutuality, all of which these critics take to be fundamental for human flourish-
ing. In other words, they tend to take the view that human dependency “is not an
exceptional circumstance. To view it as such reflects an outlook that dismisses the
importance of human interconnectedness, not only for the purposes of survival, but for
the development of culture itself” (Kittay 1999: 29).
There are two types of responses to Rawlsian liberalism that I wish to explore.
The first is a particular version of liberal feminism that attempts to meet the needs of
dependency and care, and the second is an alternative to liberalism altogether that can
be generally categorized as an “ethics of care.”
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Chapter 4
Liberal Feminism and the “Capable Self”
Martha Nussbaum (2002) attempts to salvage liberalism in the hopes of answering
the challenges presented by dependency and care, which arise naturally from the human
condition as she sees it. She begins by criticizing Rawls’s particular conception of self,
which she sees as too closely aligned with the Kantian view that posits the (rational)
human world in stark contrast to the (animalistic) world of nature. As an alternative,
she suggests we take a view of the self that is more Aristotelian/Marxian, one that
“sees the person from the start as both capable and needy—‘in need of a rich plurality
of life activities,’ to use Marx’s phrase, whose availability will be the measure of well-
being,” (194).1 Nussbaum believes liberalism is well equipped to meet the demands
of need and dependency. Specifically, she argues that if we adopt a suitable list of
“central capabilities,” a list that would include both emotion and affiliation, and use it
as an analogue to Rawls’ list of primary goods, then concerns for care and dependency
are likely to come into play often when thinking about what we need to attain social
justice. This will help us to achieve a more Aristotelian/Marxian view of the self.
Nussbaum has surely put forth a good effort to address the disregard for dependency
1Although Nussbaum argues for a more Aristotelian/Marxian view of the self, a move that initially
seems, contrary to liberal political theory, her work remains properly liberal since she positions this
new self within a larger framework of that which is necessary for attaining social justice. Nussbaum’s is
an essentially distributive notion of justice that views care and dependency as “capabilities” to which
we all have a right.
and care that is so prevalent in liberal theory, but she has not delivered on her promise
of “redesigning the political conception of the person, bringing the rational and the
animal into a more intimate relation with one another,” (193). Further, although she
is concerned about the “problems” of dependency and care, she employs a rhetoric of
capabilities that calls up an image of a self who must overcome bodily needs in order
to become a fully agentic and capable being.
Rather than accounting for the acts of dependency and care as a fundamental com-
ponent of who we are as human beings, she opts to account for dependency and care,
which stem from our “animality,” as things we must take care to secure for the indi-
vidual. Nussbaum still begins with a disembodied self for whom bodily needs must
be secured, rather than beginning with an embodied self for whom conditions of de-
pendency on others and caring for others is already a fundamental characteristic of
personhood. The distinction is an important one. My criticism is that Nussbaum has
not done enough to alter our conception of personhood, but has instead only altered
the list of things we should take into account when deciding on the principles of justice.
I argue that it is more useful for feminist political discourse to say that we are funda-
mentally caring and depending beings, and that the inability to receive or give care is
best thought of as a byproduct of a political system that distorts and is incompatible
with the human condition and its basic requirements. In contrast, Nussbaum begins
with a person who is in need of certain capabilities that she does not currently have,
much like Rawls’s person who is in need of certain primary goods that he currently
lacks.
Nussbaum wants to incorporate care and dependency into our conception of per-
sonhood, but to think of care and dependency as things that all human beings “need”
and are too often not able to “have,” presupposes that care and dependency are things
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separate and distinct from what we already are as human beings. Rather than begin-
ning with a conception of self that is always already dependent and caring, and then
working from there to determine political principles, Nussbaum believes she can secure
the material needs of dependency and care via the rational, disembodied self of Rawl-
sian liberalism simply by amending her capabilities list to include care and dependency.
This does very little to alter the Rawlsian conception of self such that we can begin to
see and experience ourselves as both caring and dependent beings. Since we are left
with the ideal of an autonomous and fully agentic political subject, we are likely to see
those in greater need of the “capability” to be dependent—to the extent that we can
even make sense of this conceptually—and the capability to care for others as somehow
deficient.
In contrast to liberal feminists like Nussbaum, ethics of care theorists do not believe
there is anything salvageable in a political theory that privileges the ideal of individu-
alism, or individual capabilities, over connectivity and interdependence. I will discuss
two strands within the ethics of care literature. The first I will refer to as the “feminine
morality” approach. It is characterized by a presupposition of the shared female expe-
rience of caring for others and it attempts to use these experiences as a model for good
behavior in society. The second, I will refer to as the “caring as politics” approach. In
contrast to the first strand, it seeks to move us away from the highly gendered and ap-
parently essentialist claims of the “feminine morality” approach by placing care within
a broader historical context of caring as political practice. Before we begin to consider
the virtues of redrawing the boundaries of the political, let us turn to those who have
asked this simple question: Who cares? The answer seems obvious. Women care.
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Chapter 5
Feminine Morality: Women as Natural Caretakers?
One is tempted to say that ethics has so far been guided by Logos, the
masculine spirit, whereas the more natural and, perhaps, stronger approach
would be through Eros, the feminine spirit.In one sense, “Eros does capture
the flavor and spirit of what I am attempting hereIn another sense, however,
even “Eros” is masculine in its roots and fails to capture the receptive ratio-
nality of caring that is characteristic of the feminine approach. (Noddings
1984: 1)
It is not difficult to see why feminist theorists have taken up the question of care
and its relationship to gender difference and inequality. The assertion that women do
most of the caretaking in our society hardly seems a radical claim. Indeed, women
are primarily responsible for the caretaking that goes on in the household, including
tending to the needs of husbands, children, aging parents, as well as caretaking that
goes on in the provate and public service sector. Almost all women engage in some
type of carework in both the private and the public realm. What has been a far
more controversial position to take, however, is the view that women are somehow
naturally inclined, and so better situated than men, to do the carework that is so
obviously necessary for a well-functioning society. Caring, when thought of in this
light, is typically constructed as a virtue that most women are lucky enough to naturally
possess.
Carol Gilligan’s now famous work, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development (1982), can be read as a challenge to the liberal conception
of the self that is strikingly apparent in the work of the psychologist to whom she is
largely responding, Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg’s (1981) account of moral develop-
ment has largely influenced many moral and political philosophers’ views on what it
means to be a functioning moral agent in a democratic society. Kohlberg found that
individuals properly progress on a moral scale from acceptance in the eyes of others
(note the relationality of the morally underdeveloped person) to an eventual Kantian
kind of selfhood, wherein respect for one’s own and others’ autonomy and conformity
to any social contract we as autonomous beings have entered into, both in reality and in
the abstract, are the driving motivators behind our moral choices. In contrast to men,
Gilligan found that women, who scored rather low on Kohlberg’s scale of moral devel-
opment, exhibit a different kind of morality—an ethic of care, which is associated more
with concrete experiences and responsibilities to others, rather than abstract principles
and an impermeable, separate sense of self. Gilligan juxtaposes women’s different voice,
or their ethic of care, with the morality of justice associated with men:
In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities
rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of
thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract.
This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers
moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relation-
ships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development
to the understanding of rights and rules. (19)
Drawing heavily on the work of Nancy Chodorow (1978), Gilligan asserts that
women’s failure to separate from others appears as their moral failure within the male-
centered field of developmental theory. Yet women’s different voice ought not to be
understood as a failure according to Gilligan, but rather is the consequence of their
“feminine orientation,” which is not constituted by individuation (8). Women are psy-
chically wired to see and act in the world one way, men another. Despite Gilligan’s
later desire to distance herself from the highly gendered conception of care she offers,
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the fact that women do most of the carework in our society and that this is likely to
produce differences in women’s and men’s perspective on the world seems difficult to
contest.1 The problem, of course, comes in when Gilligan suggests women and men are
naturally, and thus inevitably, different, though it’s important to point out that she
does not ground her argument for gender difference strictly in biology. Unfortunately,
the possibilities for transforming women and men such that both are able to take up
both justice and care are left largely unexplored by Gilligan. Yet she is to be credited
for drawing our attention to the problems that arise whenever we use men’s experiences
to measure the worth of women.
One of the most troubling aspects of Gilligan’s work is the way in which it does
not directly challenge Kohlberg’s initial findings that women are not as capable or
inclined to engage in moral reasoning of the sort we take to be required for justice.
One theorist who is not particularly troubled by this is Nel Noddings. Like Gilligan,
Noddings (1984) has also concerned herself with women’s relationship to care, drawing
heavily on the work of Gilligan to develop a more comprehensive theory of care based
on what she takes to be the moral virtues of women. In particular, Noddings is drawn
to Gilligan’s claim that women think and so act in terms of the particular rather
than the universal, and are more inclined to comprehend the concrete rather than the
abstract. In Noddings view, this is precisely what makes women better able to properly
care for others, and thus why a “feminine” approach to caring and moral education is
the correct one. Noddings provides us with a concept of care that is rather narrowly
conceived. Caring is not at all to be confused with engaging in the kind of rule-governed
behavior we find in Kohlberg’s moral stages of development. Noddings wants to draw
a sharp distinction between abstract reasoning which teaches us to see impartially and
1Okin (1990) provides an excellent critique of the assertion that women think differently from men
and are thus less predisposed than are men for thinking about justice.
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as distinct from others, and caring which demands a certain level of partiality and
relationality. Caring is most often a natural act directed toward those whom we are
closest to and who are most vulnerable, mostly children, for Noddings. The natural
act of caring requires little thought and is indeed prior to ethics (80). Yet, Noddings
believes natural care is the foundation upon which we must build a greater ethic of
care, one that is beyond our immediate loved ones, but not too far beyond them.
The caring relationship, as Noddings sees it, requires reciprocal dependency, such
that the cared-for has all of her basic needs met by the one-caring, and the one-caring
maintains her sense of self through the act of caring (48-51). Women are ethical selves
because they care for others. Noddings explains,
The ethical self is an active relation between my actual self and a vision of
my ideal as one-caring and care-for. It is born of the fundamental recogni-
tion of relatedness; that which connects me naturally to the other, recon-
nects me through the other to myself. As I care for others and am cared
for by them, I become able to care for myself. (49)
Given the intensely interpersonal dynamic of the proper care relation as she sees
it, Noddings is highly skeptical of caring that extends too far beyond those who are
close to us. Caring requires receptivity and total engrossment of the self, both of which
significantly complicate rule-based norms (51). We assume rules of behavior are laid
down for the benefit of others—the cared-for with respect to ourselves—but Noddings
argues that if we consistently and automatically follow a rule, we cannot be said to care.
We see this most clearly when commitments to personal relationships of care conflict
with larger, abstract rules that govern society but may not be in the best interest of
those we love and care for, and so are cared for by as well. Consider Noddings response
to a dilemma that entails a woman who is torn between turning in her mafia neighbor
because he is a criminal, and sparing him because he exhibits great tenderness to her
own children, has respectability in neighborhood matters, and is a kind man in her eyes:
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What should she do? The answer is by no means clear to me. Many of
us would, in great relief, turn to a principle, but I am not going to suggest
that. I am suggesting strongly that we have no ethical responsibility to co-
operate with law or government when it attempts to involve us in unethical
procedures. Spying, infiltration, entrapment, betrayal are all anathema to
one-caring, and she cannot justify them on the basis of principle. The sug-
gestion that she should participate in such activities is met by a firm, “This
I will not do,” delivered not in obedience to a principle but in faithfulness
to the fundamental relatedness that induces caring (55-56).2
Here, we see caring starkly opposed to abstract moral reasoning, where caring for
others outside of the woman’s intimate circle who might be harmed by the mafia neigh-
bor is not caring, at least not caring properly understood. What, then, can we say is
our ethical responsibility? For Noddings, it is simply to do what is quite natural for
women to do in her view: care for those whom we are closest too. Because she views
the most important kind of care as almost always a complete giving over of the self to
an/other whom one knows intimately, Noddings’s is an extremely particularistic ethic
of care and one that strikes me as profoundly apolitical. Although she does present
us with a different conception of the (female) self, one that is radically different from
the liberal self, there is no impetus to think seriously about that self here as a political
being. She gives no thought to care as a practice, as something that requires nego-
tiation, contestation, the drawing of boundaries, and the advancement of normative
claims regarding the act of care. Not only does she rely on essentialist and universalist
assumptions about “women,” and femininity too for that matter, she is guilty of ide-
alizing the world in which most of us live by assuming that we will all be cared for by
someone. Empirically, we know this is not the case. There is little effort to respond to
2Paradoxically, Noddings is suggesting the exercise of rather rigorous moral reasoning in so far as
she presumes we can and should distinguish between (what she constructs as) ethical and unethical
governmental procedures (note the language she invokes to describe what some might conceive of as
laws designed to protect the innocent: spying, infiltration, entrapment, betrayal) and then determine
the costs and advantages of following or not following such procedures. This is not unlike the highest
stage of Kohlberg’s moral development.
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the fact that many women, and certainly far more men, simply do not care, and are
often politically, economically, and socially situated in such a way as to make it very
difficult for them to do so in the way that Noddings advocates. “Caring” that is nar-
rowly conceived of as a natural inclination that one either has or has not is not helpful
for thinking about the political contexts in which care must occur in a well-functioning
democracy concerned to live up to ideals like equality, freedom, and justice. For this,
we must begin to think about care as an intentional practice.
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Chapter 6
Caring as Politics: The Intentional Practice of Care
If care is tied to the “naturalness” of women’s caring, then it is either
instinctive, or deeply social or cultural behavior, and therefore not part of
the realm of moral choice. (Tronto 1994)
Thinking about care as a political practice, not simply a morality that women pos-
sess by virtue of their biology, psychology, or status as woman or mother, allows us to
begin to think about the role of judgment in caring. Even though it may be helpful
to think about the “naturalness” of care with respect to our self-understandings, a
point we will return to a bit later, caring must also be thought of as something to be
cultivated in society. This is precisely what Sara Ruddick sets out to do in Maternal
Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (1989). In this work, Ruddick takes a mate-
rialist approach, developing a particular standpoint based on the work that mothers
do. She suggests that mothers are engaged in the work of preservative love, fostering
growth, and nurturing social acceptance. Viewed one way, Ruddick is quite similar to
Gilligan and Noddings in that she takes for granted many foundational assumptions
about women and mothering, assumptions that are certainly not universally practiced
or desired, without acknowledging that she is constructing a particular view of what
it means to be a mother. Yet, viewed another way, Ruddick’s work is instrumental in
helping us to think about the practice of caring. She clearly believes that women (as
mothers) are far more likely to be maternal thinkers and therefore already engage in
most maternal practices, and so she wishes to ground her theory in women’s experi-
ences. It is refreshing to engage with political theory that does not begin with men’s
experiences in the world or with a “neutral perspective” that is blind to important
differences. Yet, her goal is also to extend the notion of caring rooted in mothering to
a politics we can all take up. I like the way she helps us to see the value in honoring
the work of mothers because doing so keeps us attentive to current injustices and dif-
ferences with respect to gender, in a way that “even-handed talk of parenting” does not:
Since the maternal and womanly are politically and conceptually connected,
a man who engages in mothering to some extent takes on the female con-
dition and risks identification with the feminine. The fear of becoming
“feminine”—more common in men but also evident in many women—is a
motivating force behind the drive to master women and whatever is “wom-
anly.” Although I am not recommending that young boys be told they will
be mothers, grown men should confront the political meaning of “feminin-
ity” and their own fear of the feminine. A man does not, by becoming a
mother, give up his male body or any part of it. To be sure, by becoming
a mother he will, in many social groups, challenge the ideology of mas-
culinity. To a man taunted for “being a woman,” talk of parenting may be
temporarily comforting. But if he is undertaking maternal work, he is iden-
tifying with what has been, historically, womanly. What is so terrible—or
so wonderful—about that? This is the question women and men might well
sit with rather than evade. (45)
Drawing heavily on the work of Nancy Hartsock (1983), who points us toward the
possibility of extending a uniquely feminist standpoint to all human beings, Ruddick
hopes to extend maternalist thinking and practice to men, thus transforming what
it means to be a father and a man. Although she is not an essentialist of the most
troubling sort and she is careful not to ground her work in a notion of women’s natural
moral virtue, Ruddick assumes too much about the way most women mother, and she
is largely inattentive to the plurality of parenting practices that go on within and across
cultures. More important is Ruddick’s failure to adequately attend to the relationship
between an ethical politics of care and ontological claims about the self in political
theory. The maternal practice she develops is certainly incompatible with the liberal
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conception of the self, yet she does not adequately develop an alternative account upon
which to construct an ethic of care.
In an effort to get us away from the association of women with care but keep the
notion of care as political practice that Ruddick develops, Joan Tronto (1987: 1994)
has argued that practices of care best describe the qualities necessary for democratic
citizens to flourish and live well together in a pluralistic society (161-162). I think she’s
right. In Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (1994), Tronto
argues that democratic citizens are best thought of as both dependent and autonomous,
and they must be morally engaged in the sense that they must be willing to consider the
political contexts in which caring inevitably occurs. The feminine morality approach
elides moral engagement altogether and diminishes the role of autonomy far more than
Tronto thinks wise. Too much dependency and too much autonomy can threaten
democracy, and what we need is a theory that strikes a balance between the two (162-
163). Finally, Tronto reminds us that if caring is to be a political virtue then the,
“qualities of attentiveness, of responsibility, of competence, or responsiveness, need not
be restricted to the immediate objects of care, but can also inform our practices as
citizens,” (167-169).
Mary Dietz (1998) in “Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Ma-
ternal Thinking,” expresses some similar concerns about maternal thinking, or “social
feminism,” arguing that it is not women’s role as mothers but rather their role as cit-
izens that we ought to nurture and cultivate in feminist political discourse. Dietz is
troubled by social feminism because it too often employs an essentialist and narrow
conception of motherhood as a model for relationships between people who are not
intimates, but who are instead supposedly equals, which contrasts with the mother-
child relationship. For Dietz, maternal thinking cannot inform democratic political
relationships and practices because it addresses relationships among unequals, rather
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than caring relationships between citizens who are equals. I think Dietz misses an
important point that many ethics of care theorists want to make: equality is a prob-
lematic concept in any society, even in a democracy. While we may strive for the ideal
of equality in a democracy, it is elusive and it certainly isn’t the only ideal with which
we are concerned to uphold there. I think it’s appropriate to dismiss maternal thinking
on several grounds, some of which Dietz acknowledges but quickly moves past. Yet,
she misses what’s useful about maternal thinking, mainly that it helps bring into focus
varying degrees of vulnerability, dependence, and care as parts of the human condition
that must be considered when developing our practices and constructing our political
institutions.
Finally, Dietz fails to give us any explicit conception of personhood, but instead
focuses on political practices of care between equals. Political practices only make
sense if they are informed by self-understandings that serve as their basis. To suggest,
as Dietz does, that the ideal of equal participation in self-governance should be the
basis for democratic practices (of care), doesn’t help us to see what kind of self we
must govern.
In contrast, Tronto’s arguments for the need to theorize and put care into practice
depend on a conception of the self that is both autonomous and dependent. We display
varying degrees of autonomy and dependence over time, though there is still sense in
which autonomy is the goal, while dependence is a natural fact we must face with care.
Her arguments are far more rich and nuanced than those made by other ethics of care
theorists, but there is not enough attention given to bodies. This strikes me as odd, since
her project is about the redrawing of moral boundaries to encompass different practices
of care, which she sees as fundamental to a well-functioning democracy. Vulnerability
and dependence, as Tronto occasionally notes, is a necessary condition of the bodies,
which partly constitute our personhood. Indeed, bodies are more than something
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we inhabit, they are a part of who “we” are. Tronto emphasizes the moral boundary
between politics and care, but she leaves the relationship between care and corporeality
untouched. Her work logically leads us to take up the body’s relationship to politics. In
order to correct the lack of attention given to care and dependency in political theory,
we must do more than redraw the boundaries of politics to incorporate “acts of care”
into democratic practice. Those acts will not be widely accepted if they do not comport
with our understandings of (political) personhood. I argue that the body will have to
figure more prominently in terms of how we conceive of the self if we are to see care
and mutual dependence as important democratic practices. Before moving on to the
embodied self, I’d like to briefly explain why I think we need a conception of the self
at all.
The question of whether or not good political theory needs to formulate a coher-
ent account of what constitutes the political subject has been a controversial one in
contemporary political theory. This debate has taken many forms, and perhaps one
of the most fruitful areas of discussion on the subject has taken place within feminist
political theory. Questions about what “woman” means, and how useful a category of
analysis this is given the multiplicity of women’s experiences that exist have produced
provocative insights about what the stated goal of feminism can and should be.
I think it is important for political theorists to proceed with caution and under
certain conditions whenever we make claims about the self, and I want to be very clear
about what we’re doing when we make claims about shared characteristics that we
think are politically important. A conception of the self is related to the realization
of a certain kind of political freedom. Specifically, we might think about the act of
articulating a conception of the self as an act of political freedom, the act of naming
oneself. Such an act can be experienced as freedom both in the sense of acting as an
agentic being in the world who is capable of defining and negotiating one’s own identity
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and also in the construction of practices and institutions that are intended to allow one
to flourish as a human being. We cannot know what it means for “us” to flourish,
if we do not first understand who and what “us” is. Again, the intentional practice
of conceptualizing and articulating a conception of the self is also important because
claiming an identity can be an act of freedom. This is true, even as that foundation is
open to contestation by others who have a different vision of the self. But conceptions
of the self also serve another important purpose, which is to give us guidance as we
think through the politics of the world in which we live. Developing and articulating
conceptions of the self is one of the many processes whereby political theorists help us
to make meaning and order our political world.
Developing a political ethic of care that takes into account our corporeality will
allow us to better reconcile our political practices in the context of our materiality. I
believe we need a model that more accurately captures what it is that makes us human.
I propose that we explore taking up the pregnant subject as a new model of personhood.
The pregnant subject cannot meet Rawls’ criteria for political personhood, and is thus
rendered invisible in his theory of justice. Yet, its exclusion, as we shall see, may be
what opens it up as a potential site of resistance to the particular conception of (the
purely rational) self at the heart of his theory. In addition to convincing the reader
that taking up the pregnant subject as a model for rethinking personhood is the best
solution to the lack of consideration for care and dependency in liberalism and to the
lack of attention to the body in the ethics of care literature, I hope to show that it
helps us to see those aspects of our humanity, regardless of one’s sex or one’s status as
pregnant or not pregnant, that are made invisible in everyday political life. Finally, I
believe taking up the pregnant subject in this way allows us to transgress some of the
moral boundaries presupposed by traditional political theory.
If possible, I want to avoid making the kind of essentialist and universalist claims
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about “our” material existence that we see in the feminine morality type of ethics of
care, as well as the Rawlsian theory of justice, while also holding fast to my belief that
constructive and interested political theory must begin with some kind of conception
of the self. In order to do this, we will need to come to terms with the fact that every
claim about the body is ultimately a claim about how we ought to think of our bodies
and how we should negotiate the moral boundaries we think most appropriate for them.
For this, we turn to the work of Judith Butler, who can be credited with some of the
most provocative and insightful contemporary political theory on the body.
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Chapter 7
Contesting Bodily Boundaries
The central claim of Butler’s book Bodies that Matter is this: a person’s sex does
not exist prior to culture and is not a natural thing, but rather is materialized over
time through socially and culturally regulated practices. Sex is understood as an ideal
construct we have compelled into existence, not a truth we have discovered about our
biological “nature.” The idea, of course, isn’t that we have the mental power to think
physical bodies into existence, but rather that we have the political power to determine
what exactly will count as a body or, more specifically, a body that matters. The
claims we make about the self have real effects in the world. Butler is also careful
to point out that she is not denying the realness of the body or the fact that it is
“fully material,” only its status as naturally given and beyond the realm of power. She
is arguing that materiality must be rethought as the effect of power rather than the
conditions that give rise to sex/gender inequality (2). This has profound implications
for how we understand our body and embodied experiences.
This is difficult for most of us because we live and act within a rights- based liberal
society that fosters the view that our bodies are fixed and finite, the precise space
that we as rational beings are supposed to inhabit. We do not typically question the
accepted view of the boundaries of the body. We also ascribe to the view that “our”
bodies are fairly easy to distinguish from other bodies. So long as we do not harm other
bodies, we have an inalienable right to do with our own bodies as we see fit.1 Liberalism
conflicts with Butler’s claim because it forecloses the possibility of any account of the
discursive and regulatory practices that give rise to the way that we conceive of the
self, or the bodies we inhabit. Those things which constitute personhood are believed
to be self-evident and in need of little defense.
Butler suggests that the unnaturalness of nature has implications beyond sex, and
I think it will be useful to explore liberalism as a regulatory process that operates to
produce the radically individual self we find in modern liberal societies, a self that is
enclosed and defined by a body with clear and determined boundaries. I would like to
use Butler’s framework to interrogate the processes involved when the liberal self, as a
rational, self-sufficient individual, is constructed as both natural and self-evident. I’d
also like for us to think further about the effects those processes have on human beings
who are unable to ever assume, or at least maintain, the status of “rational individual,”
specifically, pregnant persons.
As we have seen, critics of liberalism and liberals who criticize Rawls often point to
a conception of the self that fails to give an account of the ways in which individuals
are embedded in cultures or traditions that inevitably shape them. As a contractarian
in the Kantian tradition, Rawls suggests that all people, once removed from cultural
or social life, are best conceived of as both autonomous and rational, and that this
particular conception is most useful for determining political principles. While it may
be the case that we enter into voluntary associations, our identity is never so entangled
with those associations as to prohibit the possibility of imagining ourselves without
them. If we take this view, it seems obvious where I stop as a physical being and you
1This view is grounded in a Lockean conception of the self, which presupposes we have property
first and foremost in our person. Although liberalism has come to deemphasize the body over time,
the boundaries of the individual’s body are still intricately linked to all liberal theories of rights in
contemporary liberalism.
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begin; the limits of my material body are readily apparent to me, and I am acutely aware
of when those boundaries have been crossed and, hopefully, when I have crossed yours.
Butler’s project, for better or worse, leads us to question the naturalness of such a self-
understanding, of how this particular body with which we are so intimately familiar
might actually be materialized through a powerful liberal discourse that dominates
both political theory and practice. Butler’s work urges us to consider the following
question: Is the individual as described by Rawls a natural and true thing that gives
rise to an obviously appropriate and even intuitive form of political organization, or
is it the effect of regulatory practices invoked in order to impose a particular form of
politics on human beings? I think the latter is worth at least taking seriously for a
moment.
Liberalism is a complex and diverse tradition that is best thought of as a family of
theories instead of just one overarching theory, so it is difficult to generalize too much
about the ideals of liberalism. Some liberals choose to emphasize autonomy, some
rationality, others focus on tolerance, and still others privilege equality. All liberals,
however, take the individual to be the primary moral and ontological unit of politics.
Most liberals believe strongly in some version of the protection of individual rights,
which, again, requires a strong account of what exactly the individual is. The material
boundaries that define a particular individual are not a product of power for the liberal,
but rather are thought to be natural. The immaterial criteria for political personhood,
again, are rationality, autonomy, self-determination, and mutual disinterest outside of
one’s associations. As stated earlier, rationality is typically understood in the liberal
tradition as the ability to possess one’s own particular plan of life and to articulate the
necessary means by which one will achieve their desired ends. This assumes, of course,
that the “truly human” being is a coherent, single self who is primarily concerned
with only one plan of life, though that might itself include a number of different and
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conflicting possibilities. This self is signified by the body, which marks its boundaries
and signals most clearly the moment where inviolability would otherwise occur. Invi-
olability presupposes coherent limits to my/self as an embodied creature. Even when
developing as children or aging as aging adults, the boundaries of the human body are
clear enough for most liberals. If bodies are not clearly identifiable, they must be made
clear because liberalism declares that we have virtually unlimited dominion over them.2
Does this understanding of the body and its relationship to individualism resonate
with everyone’s experiences of their body, as it purports to do? Another understanding
of materiality might speak to the fact that one’s bodily boundaries are constantly shift-
ing, never fully crystallizing in any concrete way. We see this most clearly in bodies
that are primarily defined by their maternality.3 Rebecca Kukla (2005) opens her book
Mass Hysteria with this insightful passage:
Female bodies, and especially pregnant and newly maternal bodies, leak,
drip, squirt, expand, contract, crave, divide, sag, dilate, and expel. It is
hard not to see why such bodies have long seemed to have dubious, hard
to fix, permeable boundaries. And to the extent that we take the integrity
and boundaries of the body as integrally intertwined with the integrity and
boundaries of the self—and we have done so, at least throughout the history
of Western culture and probably beyond—these dubious boundaries have
been a source of various species of intellectual and visceral anxiety. (3)
Although the shifting boundaries of bodies are most apparent in those bodies cen-
trally defined by their maternality or reproductive function, the ethics of care and
dependency literature also points us to the fact that our continued existence as human
2Again this is grounded in a Lockean conception of the self and our relationship to our bodies as
property. It is a peculiar relationship, however, and one that also implies that our bodies are not
entirely ours. Locke argues we cannot take our own life because we did not make it, God did. We see a
carryover from this Judeo-Christian principle in contemporary liberal societies where we can generally
do all sorts of things to our bodies, but only up to a certain point. Specifically, it is not considered an
acceptable choice by most governing bodies to take one’s own life or to aid another in the process.
3The term ‘maternality’ is here meant to refer to pregnant bodies and the bodies of new mothers.
Maternality, in this context, relates to bodies defined primarily by their reproductive function, though
I recognize that bodies can be maternal in a variety of ways.
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beings is often made possible through the care we receive from other bodies. Our bodies
depend on what are sometimes very strong relationships of dependence on other bodies
that care for us. Some bodies are primarily defined by the care they receive, while
others are defined by the care they give, though this dichotomy is in some ways a false
one since most of us are always already both caring for and receiving care from people
in our lives, whether we readily acknowledge this fact or not.
All of this is perhaps not lost on liberals who ascribe to a particularly strong ver-
sion of the coherent, separate, and autonomous physical and metaphysical self. Indeed,
the inability to always see clearly where one physically ends and another begins might
be the very reason why there is such a calculated effort to define and mark out the
boundaries of the self. For liberals, it is most often the case that we choose to become
physically entangled with other bodies and this is generally understood as a result
of both our biological needs and social desires, though the latter is emphasized, with
Nussbaum as a notable exception. Caretaking and dependency is typically seen as
contingent and something that can always be refused if the individual chooses. The
denial that mutual interest, dependence, and connectedness partly constitutes our hu-
manity is possible only if one sees the individual as coextensive with his fixed physical
boundaries, boundaries that are generally thought to be natural. Within liberalism, the
family, religion, race, and even gender, can all be conceived as unnatural and cultural
constructs. The qualities that comprise the individual at his core, however, are thought
to be natural, not cultural or political inventions.
When we concede that most of our characteristics are cultural constructions but
still others are natural, we engage in what Butler calls “delimitation,” or the process
whereby we signify some aspect of our/selves as beyond the limits of construction.
Butler writes of this process and its damaging effects to the different beings it simulta-
neously produces and excludes:
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This delimitation, which often is enacted as an untheorized presupposition
in any act of description marks a boundary that includes and excludes, that
decides, as it were, what will and will not be the stuff of the object to what
we then refer. This marking off will have some normative force and, indeed,
some violence, for it can construct only through erasing; it can bound a
thing only through enforcing a certain criterion, a principle of selectivity.
(11)
For Butler, the subject cannot emerge without a repudiation, which inevitably pro-
duces a realm of abjection (3). I would like to suggest that the liberal individual could
never fully emerge without the abject realm of pregnant persons, and we can see an ex-
ample of the production of that abject realm most clearly in the work of Rawls. In the
next section I will show that pregnant bodies are quite the opposite of the liberal con-
ception of the self. To put it another way, the liberal conception of personhood entails
a self that can never be pregnant. The pregnant self embodies a fundamental sociality,
one that entails mutual dependence and interestedness, sometimes in concert with the
desires of the mind (or “rational self”) but not always. The pregnant body is quite
irrational by liberal standards, for it does not have a singular, coherent “plan of life”
but is rather always already defined by its relationality. On the discursive formation of
the sexed subject, Butler writes that the “materialization of a given sex will centrally
concern the regulation of identificatory practices such that the identification with the
abjection of sex will be persistently disavowed,” (3). Similarly, the materialization of
the individual with clear and coherent bodily boundaries disavows any identification
with the abjection of the self-the realm of pregnant bodies. In this realm of abjection
we do not find only literally “pregnant persons,” for that is the place to which all bodies
that are unable to meet the criteria of the liberal individual are relegated. If we were
to use the pregnant self instead of the rational individual self as a model for thinking
about the democratic self, however, we would have an entirely different lens through
which to view and understand relationships of care and dependency. It is the pregnant
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body that poses a threat to the self-grounding presumptions of the individual subject.
The pregnant body is completely unintelligible within liberal discourse. By virtue
of its status of exclusion from that which is “truly human,” Butler’s framework sug-
gests that it is a potentially powerful site from which to engage in the rearticulation
of the human being. But that act will inevitably involve exclusivity and the potential
production of another abject realm. Butler calls our attention to the importance of
recognizing the particular foundations of the kind of bodies we lay down as mere con-
tingencies. Indeed, we can never escape the concession of foundations:
To “concede” the undeniability of “sex” or its “materiality” is always to
concede some version of “sex,” some formation of “materiality.” Is the
discourse in and through which that concession occurs—and, yes, that con-
cession invariably does occur—not itself formative of the very phenomenon
that it concedes? To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it
originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather,
it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the
same time a further formation of that body. (10)
If conceding the materiality of sex or of the body operates to materialize sex, and
if we are in fact the beings doing the conceding every time we resignify a regulatory
ideal, we can imagine a different kind of concession, one that might be better than the
previous foundation or ideal, though it will not be outside of power. Power is always
present, for this is one of the most valuable insights Butler offers us, as does Tronto,
who reminds us of the need to confront the political contexts of care. To construct
and then concede a different kind of human being, one that is intelligible only within
relationships of care and dependency is to undoubtedly produce still another realm of
abjection, potentially, the rational, autonomous individual of liberalism. I acknowledge
that I am arguing for a particular version of the pregnant body to be considered as an
alternative to the liberal self, and there are risks in so doing. I would like to offer the
following passage from Kukla’s books, which helps us to see what any of us do when we
implicitly or explicitly talk about “the” body in political theory, as a guiding thought
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for the final section of the paper:
Imaginatively, we put bodies to use as symbols, and our ways of imagin-
ing and representing bodies have ethical, political, practical, and medical
repercussions for those bodies. In turn our understanding of and anxieties
over those boundaries give form to our standards for caring for them. (4)
My claims about the pregnant body are contestable. The question of which claims
best capture our experiences in the world and which are best suited for living well
together in a democracy will have to be debated, but it is a debate I will leave to others.
For now, let us explore how the pregnant subject might contribute to a superior model
of personhood, one that allows for the corporeal necessity of dependence and care in
addition to rationality.
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Chapter 8
Getting Political Theory Pregnant: Conceiving an Alternative
Model of Personhood
The pregnant subject explicitly problematizes the notion of a singular self. It is
partly the delimitation of the body and the emphasis on rationality that allows us
to see the pregnant woman as either a coherent, singular being with clear and fixed
boundaries, or the woman and the fetus as two beings wherein one has the potential
for rationality and thus constitutes a distinctly separate being. I am asking that we
adopt a radically different view of pregnancy, a view that requires us to first get outside
of this framework. Let us imagine that the pregnant body really isn’t so clearly one
or two beings. Kukla writes of the difficulties in determining the boundaries of the
mother and the fetus and the complications involved in making claims about static
bodily boundaries:
One needn’t be any sort of radical social constructionist in order to notice
and take seriously the fact that the fetus and, with it, the pregnant mother
are not objects that come with ready-made stable boundaries. All roman-
ticism and moral analysis aside, the maternal body incarnates one human
being at the beginning of pregnancy and two at the end of it, and it is by
no means clear how to tell a coherent story of this passage. Debates around
abortion issues have made the contestability of any such story clear. But
upon reflection, we can see that we need not be worried about when it is or
is not acceptable to terminate a pregnancy, nor with pinning down a crisp
moment at which the fetus transforms into a person, in order to notice that
the story of this passage from one to two is a complex and murky story
to discern, involving negotiations of boundaries around and within persons
that are contestable at every stage. (4)
Because it takes into account the physical processes involved in this particular aspect
of the human condition, Kukla’s image of the pregnant person disrupts the traditional
view that it is relatively easy to disentangle the pregnant woman’s plan of life from that
of the fetus. Kukla also suggests that the pregnant body has boundaries around it that
are not static or clearly defined. Similarly, Iris Young (1990) in “Pregnant Embodi-
ment: Subjectivity and Alienation,” writes the following about the physical experience
of pregnancy as it relates to the subject’s interaction with her environment previously
thought to be beyond the boundaries of her (prepregnant) self:
Pregnancy challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering
fluid the boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside,
separate. I experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own
body. The integrity of my body is undermined in pregnancy not only by
this externality of the inside, but also by the fact that the boundaries of
my body are themselves in flux. In pregnancy I literally do not have a firm
sense of where my body ends and the world begins. My automatic body
habits become dislodged; the continuity between my customary body and
my body at this moment is broken. In pregnancy my prepregnant body
image does not entirely leave my movements and expectations, yet it is
with the pregnant body that I must move. The belly is other, since I did
not expect it there, but since I feel the touch upon it, it is me. (49-50)
If we begin to think of the pregnant body as a kind of fundamental sociality that
entails the negotiation of a shared space by two beings, as representing the splitting
of a subject, as well as the blurring of the boundaries between the self and what lies
beyond it, then we can begin to see how difficult it is to set boundaries between both
the fetus and the mother, as well as the mother and others with whom she interacts
in the world. Most importantly, this picture of pregnancy precludes the coherency of a
single “plan of life,” as both the self and the other become blurred. This blurring does
not only occur on the level of corporeality. As we have already seen, the mind is, in
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part, shaped by our embodied experiences, and so rational choices that only effect the
self and no one else become less and less coherent.
Rawls believes persons in a constitutional democracy can act autonomously when
following the principles of justice because, “they are acting from principles that they
would acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal
rational beings,” (1999: 452). Within the liberal tradition, to act autonomously is to
look only to oneself for final authority and judgment. This is a rather impermeable
position from which to act in the world, and it is not accessible to the pregnant subject
whose worldview is partly shaped by the relatedness and mutual dependence of her
particular corporeal existence. It will not be possible to look only to oneself for authority
and judgment, to do only what “the self” desires, if that self is defined primarily by
rationality. Authority and judgment invoke images of control and domination over the
self that often seem impossible in the context of two beings who must share the same
space, of a body that is doing the work of care whether the minds wants to or not, as
well as another being who is primarily dependent.
A healthy pregnant body is quite the opposite of a being that is mutually disin-
terested, as Rawls suggests we must be in order to conceptualize the principles by
which we should live together. Indeed, in order to be categorized as a healthy preg-
nant body, there must be both care and dependence simultaneously. The Rawlsian
will likely charge that the pregnant woman can easily be disinterested in her fetus, for
many pregnant women are uninterested or even hostile to the fetus they carry. Once
again, however, that framework is partly what I am taking issues with here. Such a
view depends on the assumption that the two beings are mutually exclusive. It is an
atomistic conception of personhood that is already being assumed here (even by some
pregnant persons), and it is precisely this view to which the pregnant model provides
us with an alternative.
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One Rawlsian defense of the disembodied subject in the original position is that the
subject’s ignorance of the particulars of her body does not prevent her from imagining
what kind of embodied status she will occupy once the veil is lifted. This kind of
rational knowledge is intended to allow for adequate provisions for pregnant persons,
for example, thus making the outcomes the same as if some persons behind the veil
were actually pregnant and had knowledge of their pregnancy. This, of course, is how
we arrive at the difference principle. To presume that the general rational knowledge of
the facts of life is sufficient for considering the needs and interests of pregnant persons
amounts to claiming that the mental activity of imagining one’s own pregnancy is
essentially the same as physically experiencing pregnancy. Yet, as we have seen, these
cases are not the same because we are embodied subjects, with minds that are shaped
by bodily experiences and with bodily experiences and practices that influence our
worldview.
The idea that there is purely mental capacity for imagining pregnancy is consistent
with the idea of political personhood in the Rawlsian tradition. One can make an edu-
cated guess as to the needs of pregnant persons in this case, but what one is prevented
from doing is making decisions based on the lived experiences of a pregnant person.
When asked to consider what one thinks the principles of society ought to be, we can
see that the subject who can only imagine they are pregnant can give an answer and
still uphold the conditions of rationality and mutual disinterest.
However, the latter case, that of the embodied pregnant person, forces a transgres-
sion of the rules of the original position. Taking into account the corporeality of the
pregnant person means coming to terms with compromise, being out of control, and
considering the reality of shared space wherein more than one being must exist, where
one being’s actions inevitably effects the other’s “plan of life”. Such a view would rad-
ically alter current public policy and political institutions. We could no longer account
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for carework, or dependency for that matter, as a mere preference or as an exception
to the rule of autonomy. The ability to flourish depends on the care we receive from
others, as well as the care we give to others, such that plans of life are inevitably in-
tertwined. In a sense, we might say, there exists a shared plan of life in the pregnant
subject. In the liberal tradition, communities and associations are often seen as ra-
tional choices we, as autonomous human beings, make about our lives. But we might
also think of the pregnant body as a kind of community that, beyond the particular
circumstances of conception, represents a more fundamental sociality. We begin to take
form as human beings within a community of sorts, or in a kind of sociality. Given this
fact, and the fact that pregnancy is a common experience for many people in the world,
it doesn’t seem preposterous to suggest that we are all relatively defined. Indeed we all
begin life as a participant in the sociality of pregnancy. What is important here is that
this is true by virtue of our corporeality, as well as the social conditions in which we
live. If we incorporated this into a model of political personhood, the pregnant body
could help us to rethink caring as an element of our humanity. The act of caring might
then become more difficult to refuse; it would certainly be more difficult to devalue
because it would be seen as a basic characteristic of what makes us human, rather than
something we must do for those people who are somehow deficient and not able to care
for themselves. By failing to take into account bodily knowledge and by requiring that
all subjects be rational, autonomous, and mutually disinterested Rawls has necessarily
placed a nonpregnant subject in the original position, thus obscuring certain (partly
biological) human relationships of care and dependency that are fundamental to all
persons in constitutional democracies.
Though I have just now been discussing the ways in which pregnancy is an exception
to a rule and how the pregnant subject provides us with a particularly powerful position
from which to challenge the Rawlsian conception of the self, I do think the model of
53
the pregnant subject explored here more closely approximates the existence of all of
us, pregnant and nonpregnant alike, than does the rational individual model. In this
way, I think it might be useful for us to begin to think of ourselves through that lens,
exploring the ways in which our rational plans of life are complicated by both our social
and corporeal reality.
Thinking of ourselves through that lens does not mean that we can all imagine
ourselves as pregnant persons and thus can “know” what it is like to be pregnant.
However, what I am suggesting we do is think about how the pregnant subject that
I have articulated might better capture our corporeality, or might better capture how
we should think of ourselves as democratic citizens. Perhaps care and dependency are
not best thought of us means to our ends, but are instead better thought of as part
of what makes us uniquely human. After all, what distinguishes human beings from
animals is not that we are simply rational, but rather that we possess both rationality
and animality (Nussbaum 2002: 189). Moreover, what is remarkable about personhood
is that rationality and animality are interrelated. This fact seems particularly apparent
in the pregnant body.
There are two ways in which the pregnant subject can help us think through care
and dependency as fundamental aspects of our humanity. We can see the pregnant
body as an entity that is constituted by both dependency and care; in this way, it can
help us see how the continuation and flourishing of human life is made possible by the
care we both give and receive.
The pregnant body can also help us to think about identities that are primarily
defined by either care or dependence. We cannot say that there is equality between
the pregnant woman and the fetus, though there is a level of reciprocity. But as Kittay
shows us, equality in terms of capability, rationality, and autonomy, doesn’t exist in
the real world either; dependence, especially severe dependence, is a fact of political
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life that we must attend to in our political theories and practices.
Finally, taking up the pregnant subject as an alternative to the rational individ-
ual model of personhood allows us to transgress three primary boundaries found in
Western political thought. First, as I have just stated above, the pregnant subject
complicates the mind/body distinction. Second, maternality, as represented by the
pregnant body, renders the boundaries between the self and the other blurred, con-
testable, and constantly shifting. Third, taking up the pregnant subject in this way
helps us to interrogate the assumption that the body is not relevant to political theory,
and it disrupts the boundary that currently exists between the two.
Practices and relationships of care and dependency must comport with our self-
understandings if they are to be valued and not dismissed by society. An ethic of care
is not likely to be adopted unless we have a conception of personhood that takes both
the mind and the body seriously, such that the latter brings into view both power and
vulnerability we have not yet explored. It may be the case that there are other models
that can help us to see caring and dependency as it relates to our rational and our
corporeal selves, and I certainly think other areas should be explored. I hope that I
have at least convinced the reader, however, that the pregnant body is a site worthy
of more exploration and possessing potential for bringing the mind and the body into
a more intimate and equal relationship in our conceptions of personhood, as well as in
the field of political theory.
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